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From: Andrew Grieve <agrieve@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2015 15:14:43 -0500
Message-ID: 
 <CABiQX1X1wcvN=BpnNDZK1c-ZKVSQLwBptoD9uMkZ8VRSWoRHhw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal for CSP support
To: dev <dev@cordova.apache.org>
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Definitely hoping that we can have all platforms use the same primitives.
Ian's intent and navigation whitelists work on Android and iOS atm I
believe.

On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 1:31 PM, Chuck Lantz <clantz@microsoft.com> wrote:

> I asked Kevin Hill from the Windows team working on the security model for
> Windows apps in Windows 10 to take a look at the document reference below
> for commentary given his experience in this area (including W3C
> involvement).  He added a few comments to the doc.
>
> Andrew, is your proposal intended to be Android specific or are you
> proposing that elements like allow-navigation be introduced for iOS and
> other platforms as well?
>
> -Chuck
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: agrieve@google.com [mailto:agrieve@google.com] On Behalf Of Andrew
> Grieve
> Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2015 7:59 AM
> To: dev
> Subject: Re: Proposal for CSP support
>
> I'm not sure allowing plugins to modify an apps security policy is a good
> idea because CSP only really works when the dev understands it and puts
> thought into it.
>
> A build step for CSP might be tricky because we don't actually know which
> .html files might be navigated to (as opposed to XHR'ed for templates). It
> could also be that some pages need different CSP than others.
>
> So, with Ian's whitelist changes
> - We disallow apps from navigating, openExteral, and XHR'ing by default
> - If they want the <access> behaviour back, they can install the
> legacy-whitelist plugin.
>
> Question is, what do we want them to actually do?
> Right now there's two new whitelist plugins:
>   - navigation-whitelist & intent-whitelist
>   - They look for <allow-navigation> and <allow-intent> respectively
>   - Neither of these actually open up all network access.
>
> I'd like to propose that for simplicity, we have only one "new" whitelist
> plugin that:
>   - Does what navigation-whitelist & intent-whitelist do
>   - Opens up all network requests on the native side
>   - Has JS that runs on start-up that alert()s if no CSP meta tag is
> present.
>       - It should recommend adding in the CSP that is used in the default
> app template as a start
>
> This should cover 99% of use-cases (people shouldn't need to write their
> own whitelist plugins), and (I hope) will be simple enough to figure out
> without reading too much documentation.
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Feb 20, 2015 at 5:12 PM, Jason Chase <chasej@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> > Chuck,
> >
> > Thanks for the feedback, it's good to know others are interested in CSP.
> >
> > I've created a doc to capture the proposal in a little more detail,
> > and allow for more robust comments:
> >
> > https://docs.google.com/document/d/1sfFs6LB1_giodyR4QwBMQssLKP_UxACZif
> > k-VYVX2T8/edit?usp=sharing
> >
> > In that doc, I've attempted to address the questions/comments both
> > from your email, as well as Michal's earlier response.  I'll let all
> > interested parties continue the conversation in the doc.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Jason
> >
> > On 20 February 2015 at 10:54, Chuck Lantz <clantz@microsoft.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Hey Jason - Glad to see this proposal!  A number of us at Microsoft
> > > have been talking along these same lines actually. Windows 10 apps
> > > will
> > include
> > > CSP support as the latest version of IE has support so I'd say we're
> > > completely in support of moving Cordova apps down this path.  In
> > > fact I'd want to make sure that any CSP related metadata tag
> > > injection also
> > applied
> > > to the Windows platform as well.
> > >
> > > A few of thoughts:
> > >
> > > 1. I definitely know there is quite a bit of interest still in being
> > > able to enable hosted (https accessed and controlled by the
> > > developer) app content access Cordova device APIs (which is
> > > currently a shortcoming of Windows 8.0/8.1 apps so we hear about it
> > > quite a bit).  As a result,
> > we'll
> > > want to be sure Cordova doesn't inhibit this use case at a base level.
> > > That said, having a default CSP policy that restricts hosted in the
> > > template is fine and would promote secure practices since you need
> > > to exercise caution when mixing in any remote content even when you
> > > control
> > it
> > > completely.  Also agree with inline being high risk.
> > >
> > > 2. Re: Long term, one thing that CSP doesn't cover well is which
> > > URIs should be granted elevated device access. Given hosted content
> > > with
> > plugin
> > > device API access is still a scenario we'll need to consider,
> > > perhaps we should consider using the config.xml <access> element to
> > > represent URIs that have device API access (beyond standard browser
> > > access).  Otherwise
> > we
> > > get into a bit of an "all or nothing" situation as it pertains to
> > > hosted app content which poses a larger security risk if you opt to
> > > extend
> > device
> > > API access beyond local content. (It also strikes me this is a
> > > general
> > gap
> > > in the web standard as a whole.)
> > >
> > > 3. Eval is actually a bit tougher - I know when we've look at this
> > > in the past it impacted JS frameworks far more than inline did.
> > > (Ex: With
> > Angular
> > > you can stop using eval but you take a perf hit which is a bigger
> > > deal on mobile than desktop.)  Definitely the most secure practice -
> > > but it also could cause the default template to appear to "not
> > > work."  If we omit the "unsafe-eval" directive in the CSP policy in
> > > the template we'll want to
> > be
> > > crystal clear on how to alter it.  That could be solved with proper
> > > documentation and blog posts though.
> > >
> > > 4. I'd suggest we also consider the new "browser" platform here
> > > since Chrome/Firefox/IE (as of Win 10) have support. Should be
> > > "free", but I'm guessing the metadata tag injection you mention is
> > > something we could probably just do all-up rather than only for
> specific platforms.
> > >
> > > -Chuck
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: mmocny@google.com [mailto:mmocny@google.com] On Behalf Of
> > > Michal Mocny
> > > Sent: Thursday, February 19, 2015 2:25 PM
> > > To: dev
> > > Subject: Re: Proposal for CSP support
> > >
> > > Thanks for this clear outline.
> > >
> > > Jason, I know you've been working on the short-term items for a
> > > while as part of your investigation, fixing things as you went --
> > > what is the current state of CSP support in platforms / plugins?
> > > What portion
> > already
> > > has fixes (or PR for them), what work is known but undone, and what
> > hasn't
> > > been investigated much at all?
> > >
> > > -Michal
> > >
> > > On Thu, Feb 19, 2015 at 4:55 PM, Jason Chase <chasej@chromium.org>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > > I'm interested in full-blown support for CSP (Content Security
> > > > Policy) in Cordova.  While we're close to having new and improved
> > > > whitelist functionality, there are gaps in what the whitelist is
> > > > able to protect against. In particular, inline script and eval()
> > > > are higher risks that are not addressed by whitelists.
> > > >
> > > > Many Cordova apps may use only static content, or not include any
> > > > third-party content.  However, there are certainly examples of
> > > > apps that need to include user input/third-party content, mixed
> > > > with the app's own HTML content.  In some cases, platforms may
> > > > even restrict functionality (see [1]). I think CSP is a compelling
> > > > answer for these scenarios, and for security in general for apps.
> > > >
> > > > Assuming CSP support is valuable, the question is how to implement?
> > > > Support for CSP is not universal across platforms.  It is known to
> > > > be supported on Android (KitKat and later), iOS (since 7.1), and
> Firefox.
> > > > Where supported, it is typically via a HTTP response header, or a
> > > > META tag in the document.
> > > >
> > > > I've done some investigation into feasible approaches.  As a
> > > > result, I'm proposing as below.
> > > >
> > > > Long term goal:
> > > > Cordova supports CSP in apps *and* plugins, and is enabled/secure
> > > > by default.  Ideally, CSP rules can be configurable and
> > > > automatically applied to all content (i.e. so developers can fall
> > > > into the pit of
> > > > success)
> > > >
> > > > Achieving this goal will likely require incremental progress over
> > > > a number of releases.  At a high level, first make changes so
> > > > developers can manually apply CSP to their apps.  Longer term, add
> > > > support for configurability and automatic application of CSP.
> > > >
> > > > Short term plan:
> > > > - Change new app template to contain CSP meta tag with a default,
> > > > secure policy (i.e. no inline script, eval(), only local app
> > > > content)
> > > > - Remove any blockers to default policy from framework and core
> > plugins.
> > > > This would be a continuation of the work in CB-8210, applied to
> > > > other platforms.  For example, this would fix any framework code
> > > > that relies on sending javascript to be executed inline, from the
> > > > native side
> > > > - Deprecate any framework APIs that allow less secure practices.
> > > > Many already are marked as deprecated (at least on Android)
> > > > - Update docs/samples to include CSP, and clearly state that use
> > > > of inline javascript is deprecated
> > > >
> > > > Long term plan:
> > > > - In a future major release, remove the previously deprecated
> > > > framework APIs
> > > > - Define/implement a configuration model for CSP rules
> > > > - Implement a build/package step to apply configured CSP rules to
> > > > all content as meta tags.  Run-time support involves re-writing
> > > > content, and/or intercepting resource requests.  The feasibility
> > > > of intercepting requests is highly variable across platforms, at
> > > > greater cost/complexity than build-time.
> > > >
> > > > I'm very interested in any comments on this proposal.  This
> > > > includes questions around use cases (missing or otherwise),
> > > > different requirements, technical concerns, .etc.
> > > >
> > > > Thanks,
> > > > Jason
> > > > Google Cordova Team
> > > >
> > > > [1] http://callback.markmail.org/thread/yxmmya2o2lc26tpi
> > > >
> > >
> >
>
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