cordova-dev mailing list archives

Site index · List index
Message view « Date » · « Thread »
Top « Date » · « Thread »
From Brian LeRoux...@brian.io>
Subject Re: whitelist as a plugin
Date Wed, 09 Jul 2014 17:17:39 GMT
Or remove it altogether and let the evolution of that code be maintained by
those interested in the narrative it provides? :)

On Wednesday, July 9, 2014, Andrew Grieve <agrieve@chromium.org> wrote:

> Sounds like we both agree that it doesn't work and adds a false sense of
> security (to those that do opt into it) :P.
>
> Maybe what we should do is redesign the whitelist to do something more
> useful.
>
> e.g. A whitelist that says what URLs you can navigate to is useful and easy
> to implement. Let's just drop the trying to stop network requests aspect of
> it?
>
>
> On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 12:54 PM, Joe Bowser <bowserj@gmail.com
> <javascript:;>> wrote:
>
> > I'm in agreement with Andrew on this one.  If we can get CSP working,
> > that's a far better solution than our Whitelist, which was done
> > because it was needed at the time for the enterprise use case that IBM
> > had.  I don't think we're ever going to stop are users from doing dumb
> > things like including thirdpartyadnetworkthatdoesnoteusehttps.js in
> > their apps any time soon, but they'll have to jump through more hoops
> > to do dumb things, and making dumb things harder is a good thing.
> >
> > On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 9:47 AM, Brian LeRoux <b@brian.io <javascript:;>>
> wrote:
> > > Heh. Why do we always seem to be at the opposite end of considerations?
> > > (Not a bad thing anyhow. ;)
> > >
> > > So making whitelist a plugin would most certainly isolate the code
> which
> > > would help us better understand:
> > >
> > > 1.) where the surface for bugs are (we seem to miss/find new security
> > holes
> > > each quarter…)
> > > 2.) if people actually use it
> > >
> > > I'm more interested in #2. I suspect the only people whom do use it are
> > > security researchers disproving the whitelist veracity. I feel this API
> > was
> > > a mistake, is misleading, and ultimately leads to poor web security
> > > practices wrt 3rd part scripts. I'd like the evidence to remove it
> > > completely and making it a plugin would do that. (And still allow for
> its
> > > existence to those whom want to contribute to a "marketing" based api.)
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 6:52 AM, Andrew Grieve <agrieve@chromium.org
> <javascript:;>>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > >> I don't think moving the whitelist to a plugin would aid in its
> > >> understanding. Right now the whitelist is used for two things:
> > >>
> > >> 1. Whether to allow network requests through (although this is broken
> > for
> > >> <audio>/<video> on iOS, and broken for them + websockets on
Android
> > >> 2. Whether to allow top frame navigations (e.g. clicking a link to
> > http://
> > >> *
> > >> opens in system browser vs. webview)
> > >>
> > >> #1 doesn't work very well due to technical limitations.
> > >> #2 is actually the more import one security-wise I think, and I don't
> > think
> > >> should be relegated to a plugin.
> > >>
> > >> I'm hoping medium-term that CSP can replace the use-case of #1.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> On Mon, Jul 7, 2014 at 10:21 PM, Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org
> <javascript:;>>
> > >> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> > What would be the security implication of removing it from core? No
> > >> access
> > >> > at all by default? Or unlimited access by default?
> > >> >
> > >> > I suspect that if the default policy with no plugin installed is the
> > >> > latter, then we will be given the impression that it's not important
> > at
> > >> all
> > >> > :)
> > >> >
> > >> > I had considered just turning the whitelist settings into a plugin
> --
> > >> > either leaving the default rules as they are, and writing a
> > >> > "cordova-security" plugin that locks it down, or tighten everything
> by
> > >> > default, and tell people to install "cordova-plugin-insecurity" if
> > they
> > >> > want to open it up :)
> > >> >
> > >> > I like the idea of making the entire whitelist architecture into a
> > >> plugin,
> > >> > though. If nothing else, it should be easier to reason about it, and
> > >> easier
> > >> > to fix or replace it in the future if we need to.
> > >> >
> > >> >
> > >> > On Mon, Jul 7, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Shazron <shazron@gmail.com
> <javascript:;>> wrote:
> > >> >
> > >> > > Actually it's already possible in any iOS version, we just have
to
> > >> > > make sure the plugin loads at startup. This is for UIWebView
only,
> > >> > > WKWebView has this issue:
> > >> > > https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CB-7049 - you can't
> intercept
> > >> > > any requests from it currently (not sure if anything changed
in
> iOS
> > 8
> > >> > > beta 3)
> > >> > >
> > >> > > On Mon, Jul 7, 2014 at 11:45 AM, Brian LeRoux <b@brian.io
> <javascript:;>> wrote:
> > >> > > > Was discussing this w/ Shaz and Joe and, in theory, this
is
> > possible
> > >> > from
> > >> > > > iOS8 onward and possibly w/ some refactoring in the 4.x
series
> of
> > >> > > Android.
> > >> > > >
> > >> > > > Its also probably the single most problematic areas of
> > >> misunderstanding
> > >> > > as
> > >> > > > it relates to security we have. Isolating it from core would
> give
> > us
> > >> a
> > >> > > > better picture of how important it truly is.
> > >> > > >
> > >> > > > Thoughts?
> > >> > >
> > >> >
> > >>
> >
>

Mime
  • Unnamed multipart/alternative (inline, None, 0 bytes)
View raw message