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From "Brett Porter (JIRA)" <>
Subject [jira] (CONTINUUM-838) Cross Site Request Forgery protection
Date Wed, 21 Nov 2012 23:45:13 GMT


Brett Porter closed CONTINUUM-838.

    Resolution: Duplicate
      Assignee: Brett Porter
> Cross Site Request Forgery protection
> -------------------------------------
>                 Key: CONTINUUM-838
>                 URL:
>             Project: Continuum
>          Issue Type: Improvement
>          Components: Web interface
>    Affects Versions: 1.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3, 1.1-alpha-1
>            Reporter: Christian Gruber
>            Assignee: Brett Porter
>            Priority: Critical
>              Labels: backlog-to-cleanup
> XSRF vulnerabilities are very hard to fix.  More details on them at
with a key document found at which outlines
a solution.
> In short, an XSRFProtectionToken is passed in each form in a hidden variable, with the
XSRFProtectionToken consisting of (pseudocode): 
> hash(sessionid + actionName + sitewide_secret);
> The hash can be MD5 or SHA-1 or whatever.  The important thing is that even if a user
is logged on with a valid sessionId, the attacker cannot know in advance what the token will
be without getting it out of an insecure browser (in which case, you have other problems).
  Even if the attacker gets access to a token for one action that's less security-risky (like
invoking a build), they cannot then replay that token against something more risky (such as
creating a new admin user).

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