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From Christopher <ctubb...@apache.org>
Subject Re: Use of MD5 and SHA1 for download verification
Date Thu, 26 Jan 2017 20:01:41 GMT
To be clear, those "trusted signatures" should be using strong hash
algorithms themselves. (As well as sufficiently long keys.)
I raised the issue of weak hashes in GPG signatures for Maven projects at
ASF with https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MPOM-118 , but non-Maven
projects which manually sign releases should probably take care to ensure
their signatures are adequate. I consider this a release-voting quality
assurance step, and encourage projects to examine the signatures attached
to their release candidates as part of their release process.

On Thu, Jan 26, 2017 at 2:27 PM Ted Dunning <ted.dunning@gmail.com> wrote:

> SHA1 and MD5 have been individually compromised, but a combined hash has
> not been.
>
> Regardless, Sebb's comment that hashes are worthless for authentication and
> tamper-detection is spot-on. You have to look to trusted signatures for
> that.
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jan 26, 2017 at 10:20 AM, Mike Lissner <
> mlissner@michaeljaylissner.com> wrote:
>
> > I filed a bug about this already, but I've been directed to email here
> > instead. The bug I filed is:
> > https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/INFRA-12626
> >
> > Basically, on download pages we provide obsolete hashes for our downloads
> > (MD5 and SHA1). These are meant, as I understand it, to serve two
> purposes.
> > First, they allow you to make sure that your download succeeded. Second,
> > they allow you to ensure that your download wasn't tampered with.
> >
> > For the first purpose: Great. They work. For the second purpose, however,
> > we need to move away from MD5 and SHA1 hashes, both of which can now be
> > attacked with relatively modest hardware.
> >
> > Browsers are moving away from SHA1 at a very fast pace. See:
> >
> > https://security.googleblog.com/2014/09/gradually-sunsetting-sha-1.html
> >
> > And:
> >
> > https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2014/09/23/phasing-
> > out-certificates-with-sha-1-based-signature-algorithms/
> >
> > I don't know who's responsible for this, but my bug was closed because
> it's
> > not the infrastructure team, and so I'm trying here.
> >
> > I suggest we move to SHA2 hashes for all verification purposes.
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > Mike
> >
>
-- 
Christopher

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