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Date: 10 Nov 2004 18:09:19 -0000
Message-ID: <20041110180919.24961.qmail@nagoya.betaversion.org>
From: bugzilla@apache.org
To: commons-dev@jakarta.apache.org
Cc: 
Subject: DO NOT REPLY [Bug 32145]  -
    use a secure delete if the file is written to the disk

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http://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=32145

use a secure delete if the file is written to the disk


------- Additional Comments From martinc@apache.org  2004-11-10 18:09 -------
People who care about security as you describe would be much better off not 
writing to the file system in the first place, or encrypting the files as they 
are written to disk. Either of these can be accomplished by implementing a 
custom FileItemFactory.

Using a secure deletion mechanism still leaves the file wide open on the disk 
for the duration of its processing. That would be a half-hearted approach to 
security at best. Wouldn't implementing such a mechanism be more likely to lull 
people into a false sense of security?

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