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From "ASF subversion and git services (JIRA)" <>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (CLOUDSTACK-9993) Secure Agent Communications
Date Mon, 28 Aug 2017 10:16:00 GMT


ASF subversion and git services commented on CLOUDSTACK-9993:

Commit 7ce54bf7a85d6df72f84c00fadf9b0fd42ab0d99 in cloudstack's branch refs/heads/master from
[;h=7ce54bf ]

CLOUDSTACK-9993: Securing Agents Communications (#2239)

This introduces a new certificate authority framework that allows
pluggable CA provider implementations to handle certificate operations
around issuance, revocation and propagation. The framework injects
itself to `NioServer` to handle agent connections securely. The
framework adds assumptions in `NioClient` that a keystore if available
with known name `cloud.jks` will be used for SSL negotiations and

This includes a default 'root' CA provider plugin which creates its own
self-signed root certificate authority on first run and uses it for
issuance and provisioning of certificate to CloudStack agents such as
the KVM, CPVM and SSVM agents and also for the management server for
peer clustering.

Additional changes and notes:
- Comma separate list of management server IPs can be set to the 'host'
  global setting. Newly provisioned agents (KVM/CPVM/SSVM etc) will get
  radomized comma separated list to which they will attempt connection
  or reconnection in provided order. This removes need of a TCP LB on
  port 8250 (default) of the management server(s).
- All fresh deployment will enforce two-way SSL authentication where
  connecting agents will be required to present certificates issued
  by the 'root' CA plugin.
- Existing environment on upgrade will continue to use one-way SSL
  authentication and connecting agents will not be required to present
- A script `keystore-setup` is responsible for initial keystore setup
  and CSR generation on the agent/hosts.
- A script `keystore-cert-import` is responsible for import provided
  certificate payload to the java keystore file.
- Agent security (keystore, certificates etc) are setup initially using
  SSH, and later provisioning is handled via an existing agent connection
  using command-answers. The supported clients and agents are limited to
  CPVM, SSVM, and KVM agents, and clustered management server (peering).
- Certificate revocation does not revoke an existing agent-mgmt server
  connection, however rejects a revoked certificate used during SSL
- Older `cloudstackmanagement.keystore` is deprecated and will no longer
  be used by mgmt server(s) for SSL negotiations and handshake. New
  keystores will be named `cloud.jks`, any additional SSL certificates
  should not be imported in it for use with tomcat etc. The `cloud.jks`
  keystore is stricly used for agent-server communications.
- Management server keystore are validated and renewed on start up only,
  the validity of them are same as the CA certificates.

New APIs:
- listCaProviders: lists all available CA provider plugins
- listCaCertificate: lists the CA certificate(s)
- issueCertificate: issues X509 client certificate with/without a CSR
- provisionCertificate: provisions certificate to a host
- revokeCertificate: revokes a client certificate using its serial

Global settings for the CA framework:
- ca.framework.provider.plugin: The configured CA provider plugin
- ca.framework.cert.keysize: The key size for certificate generation
- ca.framework.cert.signature.algorithm: The certificate signature algorithm
- ca.framework.cert.validity.period: Certificate validity in days
- ca.framework.cert.automatic.renewal: Certificate auto-renewal setting
- ca.framework.background.task.delay: CA background task delay/interval
- ca.framework.cert.expiry.alert.period: Days to check and alert expiring certificates

Global settings for the default 'root' CA provider:
- ca.plugin.root.private.key: (hidden/encrypted) CA private key
- ca.plugin.root.public.key: (hidden/encrypted) CA public key
- (hidden/encrypted) CA certificate
- ca.plugin.root.issuer.dn: The CA issue distinguished name
- ca.plugin.root.auth.strictness: Are clients required to present certificates
- ca.plugin.root.allow.expired.cert: Are clients with expired certificates allowed

UI changes:
- Button to download/save the CA certificates.

Misc changes:
- Upgrades bountycastle version and uses newer classes
- Refactors SAMLUtil to use new CertUtils

Signed-off-by: Rohit Yadav <>

> Secure Agent Communications
> ---------------------------
>                 Key: CLOUDSTACK-9993
>                 URL:
>             Project: CloudStack
>          Issue Type: New Feature
>      Security Level: Public(Anyone can view this level - this is the default.) 
>            Reporter: Rohit Yadav
>            Assignee: Rohit Yadav
>             Fix For: Future,
> In current CloudStack, the agent-management server communication is weakly secured by
one way SSL authentication while encrypted and allows for any client/agent to connect and
be served by the management server. There are other services that need TLS/SSL security and
upcoming features such as container/application service etc. require certificate management.
The common issue is CloudStack has no certificate management to provide security for its internal
component especially the agent-mgmt server and mgmt-mgmt server communication. The aim of
this feature is to provide pluggable CA (certificate authority) management in CloudStack that
can fetch/provision certificates to (new) host(s) and systemvms. As a default CA plugin, a
root CA plugin will be implement where CloudStack becomes a self-signed Root Certificate Authority.
Developers will have option to implement further integration with their TLS/SSL cert providers
such as letsencrypt and other vendors.

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