Return-Path: X-Original-To: apmail-camel-issues-archive@minotaur.apache.org Delivered-To: apmail-camel-issues-archive@minotaur.apache.org Received: from mail.apache.org (hermes.apache.org [140.211.11.3]) by minotaur.apache.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 5F5E510382 for ; Mon, 2 Dec 2013 14:21:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 66769 invoked by uid 500); 2 Dec 2013 14:19:11 -0000 Delivered-To: apmail-camel-issues-archive@camel.apache.org Received: (qmail 66655 invoked by uid 500); 2 Dec 2013 14:18:59 -0000 Mailing-List: contact issues-help@camel.apache.org; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Post: List-Id: Reply-To: dev@camel.apache.org Delivered-To: mailing list issues@camel.apache.org Received: (qmail 66578 invoked by uid 99); 2 Dec 2013 14:18:45 -0000 Received: from arcas.apache.org (HELO arcas.apache.org) (140.211.11.28) by apache.org (qpsmtpd/0.29) with ESMTP; Mon, 02 Dec 2013 14:18:45 +0000 Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2013 14:18:45 +0000 (UTC) From: "Hadrian Zbarcea (JIRA)" To: issues@camel.apache.org Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Subject: [jira] [Work started] (CAMEL-7002) PGPDataFormat: restrict verifying public keys MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-JIRA-FingerPrint: 30527f35849b9dde25b450d4833f0394 [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-7002?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ] Work on CAMEL-7002 started by Hadrian Zbarcea. > PGPDataFormat: restrict verifying public keys > --------------------------------------------- > > Key: CAMEL-7002 > URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-7002 > Project: Camel > Issue Type: Improvement > Components: camel-crypto > Reporter: Franz Forsthofer > Assignee: Hadrian Zbarcea > Fix For: 2.12.3, 2.13.0 > > Attachments: 0001-PGPDataFormat-signatureUserIds-added.patch > > > During the signature verification with PGPDataFormat currently all public keys contained in the public keyring are taken into account. So the current semantic is: Verify the signature against all public keys in the keyring. IF you have a keyring with lot of public keys you will not want that every identity represented by the public keys can sent to you a signature. Normally you want to know from which identity the signature comes. Therefore I have introduced the possibility to restrict the verifying publikc keys; I have introduced the parameter signatureKeyUserids where you specify the Userids the publc keys must have in order to be allowed to verify a signature. -- This message was sent by Atlassian JIRA (v6.1#6144)