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From "Daniel Kulp (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (CAMEL-7072) Veracode compliance. Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection') (CWE ID 470) in AnnotationTypeConverterLoader
Date Tue, 17 Dec 2013 12:30:07 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-7072?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13850399#comment-13850399
] 

Daniel Kulp commented on CAMEL-7072:
------------------------------------

I kind of agree with Willem.   This code pushes the call into ObjectHelper (which I'm OK with),
but my expectation is that Object Helper would be flagged for the same reason.

In addition, your patch throws a ClassNotFoundException which is then immediately caught and
ignored in the try/catch.   That seems silly.   Plus, ObjectHelper already checks the name
passed in to see if it's empty.


> Veracode compliance. Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe
Reflection') (CWE ID 470) in AnnotationTypeConverterLoader
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: CAMEL-7072
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-7072
>             Project: Camel
>          Issue Type: Improvement
>    Affects Versions: 2.12.2
>            Reporter: Leonid Marushevskiy
>            Assignee: Willem Jiang
>              Labels: Security, Veracode
>
> Pull request https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/68
> During Veracode scan of our application we discover issue with security in Camel. Please
review our fix and apply it in future versions. 
> Quote from Veracode report below:
> Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection') (CWE
ID470)(1 flaw)
> Description
> A call uses reflection in an unsafe manner. An attacker can specify the class name to
be instantiated, which may
> create unexpected control flow paths through the application. Depending on how reflection
is being used, the attack
> vector may allow the attacker to bypass security checks or otherwise cause the application
to behave in an unexpected
> manner. Even if the object does not implement the specified interface and a ClassCastException
is thrown, the
> constructor of the user-supplied class name will have already executed.
> Effort to Fix: 2 - Implementation error. Fix is approx. 6-50 lines of code. 1 day to
fix.
> Recommendations
> Validate the class name against a combination of white and black lists to ensure that
only expected behavior is
> produced.
> Instances found via Static Scan
> Module # Class # Module Location Fix By Flaw Id
> .../AnnotationTypeConverterLoader.java - line 168



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