Return-Path: Delivered-To: apmail-ws-axis-dev-archive@www.apache.org Received: (qmail 3007 invoked from network); 26 Sep 2003 19:07:15 -0000 Received: from daedalus.apache.org (HELO mail.apache.org) (208.185.179.12) by minotaur-2.apache.org with SMTP; 26 Sep 2003 19:07:15 -0000 Received: (qmail 75083 invoked by uid 500); 26 Sep 2003 19:07:00 -0000 Delivered-To: apmail-ws-axis-dev-archive@ws.apache.org Received: (qmail 74965 invoked by uid 500); 26 Sep 2003 19:06:59 -0000 Mailing-List: contact axis-dev-help@ws.apache.org; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk Reply-To: axis-dev@ws.apache.org list-help: list-unsubscribe: list-post: Delivered-To: mailing list axis-dev@ws.apache.org Received: (qmail 74948 invoked from network); 26 Sep 2003 19:06:59 -0000 Message-ID: <3F748E57.3000606@iseran.com> Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2003 12:07:03 -0700 From: Steve Loughran User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030701 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "axis-dev@ws.apache.org" Subject: Verisign DNS changes and impact on web services Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Rating: daedalus.apache.org 1.6.2 0/1000/N X-Spam-Rating: minotaur-2.apache.org 1.6.2 0/1000/N I've been doing some experiments on what effect the DNS changes have on Axis and the .NET stack; notes are up on : http://www.iseran.com/Steve/blog/ essentially both bail out with unhelpful error messages at the 302 redirect sent back from the spoof http server that appears at every invalid .com address. This redirect is sent back *after* the post, so you end up posting everything once before getting to the brick wall. Everything breaks properly; the only issue is that the response codes are not obviously 'wrong endpoint'. Do you want to deal with customers saying they keep getting '302(found)' messages? We could fix axis to recognise this specific situation -error code = 302 -location header = sitefinder.verisign.com and map it into a java.io.UnknownHostException to throw upstream; this may be more meaningful. This would be an ugly hack, but what verisign have done is an even uglier hack. What we cannot do easily is recognise trouble at anything other than port 80; hitting an endpoint http://invalidname.com:8080/ is going to result in a connection refused error instead. Maybe we should just make sure the full endpoint URL goes into the fault, so that people can look at it easily.