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From Steve Niemitz <sniem...@apache.org>
Subject Re: Looking for feedback - Setting CommandInfo.user by default when launching tasks.
Date Tue, 29 Mar 2016 20:31:30 GMT
So maybe we add it, but don't change the current default behavior?

On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 4:26 PM, Bill Farner <wfarner@apache.org> wrote:

> I'm in favor of moving forward.  There's no requirement to use the
> Announcer, and a non-root executor seems like a useful option.
>
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 1:00 PM, Steve Niemitz <sniemitz@apache.org>
> wrote:
>
> > Makes sense, I guess it can be up to the cluster operator which model to
> > choose.  Is there any interest in the feature I proposed or should I just
> > drop it?  It's not a lot of code, but also it's not a requirement for
> > anything we're working on either (the docker stuff however, is).
> >
> > On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 1:39 PM, Bill Farner <wfarner@apache.org> wrote:
> >
> > > That's correct - those credentials should require privileged access.
> > >
> > > On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Steve Niemitz <
> > > sniemitz@twitter.com.invalid> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Re: ZK credential files, thats an interesting issue, I assume you
> don't
> > > > want the role user to be able to read it either, and only root or
> some
> > > > other privileged user?
> > > >
> > > > On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 12:14 PM, Erb, Stephan <
> > > > Stephan.Erb@blue-yonder.com>
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > I am in favor of your proposal. We offer less attack surface if the
> > > > > executor is not running as root.
> > > > >
> > > > > Interesting though, this introduces another security problem: The
> > > > > credentials file in the incoming Zookeeper  ACL patch (
> > > > > https://reviews.apache.org/r/45042/) will have to be readable by
> > > > > everyone. That feels a little bit like being back to square one.
> > > > > ________________________________________
> > > > > From: Steve Niemitz <sniemitz@apache.org>
> > > > > Sent: Tuesday, March 29, 2016 17:34
> > > > > To: dev@aurora.apache.org
> > > > > Subject: Looking for feedback - Setting CommandInfo.user by default
> > > when
> > > > > launching tasks.
> > > > >
> > > > > I've been working on some changes to how aurora submits tasks to
> > mesos,
> > > > > specifically around Docker tasks, but I'd also like to see how
> people
> > > > feel
> > > > > about making it more general.
> > > > >
> > > > > Currently, when Aurora submits a task to mesos, it does NOT set
> > > > > command.user on the ExecutorInfo, this means that mesos configures
> > the
> > > > > sandbox (mesos sandbox that is) as root, and launches the executor
> > > > > (thermos_executor in our case) as root as well.
> > > > >
> > > > > What then happens is that the executor then chown()s the sandbox
it
> > > > creates
> > > > > to the aurora role/user, and also setuid()s the runners it forks
to
> > > that
> > > > > role/user.  However, the executor itself is still running as root.
> > > > >
> > > > > My proposal / change is to set command.user to the aurora role by
> > > > default,
> > > > > which will cause the executor to run as that user.  I've tested
> this
> > > > > already, and no changes are needed to the executor, it will still
> try
> > > to
> > > > > chown the sandbox (which is fine since it already owns it), and
> > > setuid()
> > > > > the runners it forks (again, fine, since they're already running
as
> > > that
> > > > > user).
> > > > >
> > > > > *The controversial part of this* however is I'd like to enable this
> > > > > behavior BY DEFAULT, and allow disabling it (reverting to the
> current
> > > > > behavior now) via a flag to the scheduler.  My reasoning here is
> two
> > > > fold.
> > > > >  1) It's a more secure default, preventing a compromised executor
> > from
> > > > > doing things it shouldn't, and 2) we already have a lot of "flag
> > > bloat",
> > > > > and flags are hard enough to discover as they are.  However, I do
> > > believe
> > > > > this should be considered as a "breaking change", particularly
> > because
> > > of
> > > > > finicky PEX extraction for the executor.
> > > > >
> > > > > I'd like to hear people's thoughts on this.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
>

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