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From Bill Farner <wfar...@apache.org>
Subject Re: [DISCUSS] Build security
Date Wed, 30 Jul 2014 17:09:56 GMT
FWIW the filing of the ticket was reactionary only to the availability of a
 solution, now of the scare (i've been twitchy about this for a long time).


> Is this really a rampant issue causing jars to be widely compromised


Why wait for a publicized attack?  Since we know this presents a risk, we
should apply known strategies to mitigate the risk.

since maven central is going to ssl in the near future


This is definitely a plus, but AFAICT doesn't help us if maven central is
compromised.



-=Bill


On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 9:44 AM, Jake Farrell <jfarrell@apache.org> wrote:

> +0
>
> Aurora-620: Is this really a rampant issue causing jars to be widely
> compromised, great blog post, but any documentation of this exploit
> actually occurring. To me this seems like additions that are not needed
> especially since maven central is going to ssl in the near future.
>
> Aurora-616: The gradle witness plugin will test against the listed
> dependencies in our build.gradle but it does not verify any sub
> dependencies. It would be better for us to vendor cache all of our
> dependencies if we are really worried about this.
>
> -Jake
>
>
> On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 12:10 PM, Kevin Sweeney <kevints@apache.org>
> wrote:
>
> > Hi all,
> >
> > Recently in the news there has been a lot of controversy regarding Maven
> > Central's lack of HTTPS support (without a donation for an access key
> which
> > isn't redistributable, see [1], [2], [3] for context). While Sonatype
> plans
> > to deploy HTTPS for all fix it there is an exploit tool in the wild.
> > JCenter is an alternate Maven Central mirror that contains the
> dependencies
> > we currently get from Maven Central. It allows free HTTPS access.
> >
> > I propose we immediately accept my patch [4] to switch to JCenter over
> > HTTPS, buying us an immediate mitigation to the exploit tool in the wild.
> > Longer-term we can switch to checksum-pinning our dependencies [5], which
> > will allow us to use any Maven mirror as long as we trust our git origin
> > servers and committers.
> >
> > Though it wasn't called out in the press, our Python dependencies are
> > probably vulnerable to a similar issue and I've filed an issue [6] to
> > investigate checksum-pinning there too.
> >
> > Please discuss, and if you agree please give a shipit to my review.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Kevin
> >
> > [1]
> >
> >
> http://blog.ontoillogical.com/blog/2014/07/28/how-to-take-over-any-java-developer/
> > [2]
> >
> http://blog.sonatype.com/2014/07/ssl_connectivity_for_central/#.U9kVOnVdXmE
> > [3] https://twitter.com/bintray/status/494129921363824640
> > [4] https://reviews.apache.org/r/24063/
> > [5] https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/AURORA-616
> > [6] https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/AURORA-618
> >
>

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