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From Edmon Begoli <ebeg...@gmail.com>
Subject Re: Security and data design advice on structuring data on accumulo
Date Fri, 10 Aug 2012 16:02:11 GMT
Adam,

This role label categorization you proposed is very close, if not
exact representation of the need:

(adamsHealthTeam&(regularCheckup|illnessEvaluation))|(massStateResearcher&populationStudy)

Challenge is to create and manage hierarchy that is almost completely
personalized - similar to OAuth/OpenID
permission managed by Google, but in this case represented through labels.


On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 9:02 AM, Adam Fuchs <afuchs@apache.org> wrote:
> I guess I should have specified that the access time labels should be used
> in conjunction with the role labels, like
> "(adamsHealthTeam&(regularCheckup|illnessEvaluation))|(massStateResearcher&populationStudy)".
>
> Adam
>
> On Aug 10, 2012 8:56 AM, "Benson Margulies" <bimargulies@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 8:52 AM, Adam Fuchs <afuchs@apache.org> wrote:
>> > Not sure I understand why this gets into n*m roles. Can you elaborate?
>> >
>> > The question of when your physician should have access seems like it
>> > could
>> > be represented by just a few labels, like "regularCheckup",
>> > "illnessEvaluation", and "populationStudy". Those labels could then be
>> > tied
>> > to an auditing system that could verify appropriateness of access over
>> > time.
>>
>> And if you change doctors? Maybe that's a job for some sort of role/group
>> model.
>>
>>
>> >
>> > Adam
>> >
>> > On Aug 9, 2012 10:19 PM, "Josh Elser" <josh.elser@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> I've thought quite a bit about the approach you've outlined
>> >> previously..
>> >>
>> >> The main caveat I've always struggled to overcome is how to encapsulate
>> >> *when* a physician should have access to your records. This expands the
>> >> problem into n*m roles which becomes difficult to manage inside
>> >> Accumulo,
>> >> especially as time elapses.
>> >>
>> >> On 8/8/2012 6:29 PM, Marc Parisi wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>> Just some ideas and thoughts....
>> >>>
>> >>> With a system I'm building I have code to take care of user roles.
>> >>> Roles
>> >>> will define visibilities, how analysis is performed, information
>> >>> sharing, etc. I have a particular role for sharing. I also have an
>> >>> area
>> >>> of interest, usually assigned to a physician role, therefore only a
>> >>> physician's office can see certain data from it. The data
>> >>> corresponding
>> >>> to a given person can be accessed by that person ( if they have app
>> >>> access ), the physician that created it, and other physicians ( with
a
>> >>> different area of interest ) with whom the user wants to share their
>> >>> data. Each area of interest will be cryptographically secured. Our
>> >>> approach will utilize multiple crypto technologies. I would suggest
>> >>> making crypto your last stop. Focus on getting
>> >>> the visibility hierarchy designed. HIPAA requirements can come later.
>> >>>
>> >>> In my approach, there is no elevation of fields per se. Instead, there
>> >>> are visibiilities for all assigned parties,so in my case it is a
>> >>> matter
>> >>> of labeling. The data can have hierarchies, and each hierarchy has
>> >>> different labels to control access.
>> >>>
>> >>> " Patient demographic fields are PHI (personal health information) and
>> >>> these should not be visible to all who want to perform analysis, but
>> >>> only to main administrators,
>> >>> patient and maybe physician. I assume these would have to have
>> >>> separate authorization label. "
>> >>>
>> >>> Yes. I think this is where roles will help. Assign roles and
>> >>> visibilities to those roles. As of right now, I'm putting ephemeral
>> >>> data
>> >>> in my visibilities ( user ID for a physician, among other things ).
I
>> >>> will probably move this to the qualifier and take a more simple
>> >>> approach
>> >>> to visibilities.
>> >>>
>> >>> Each role has different actions. Right now I have four actions;
>> >>> syncing,
>> >>> querying, deleting, and sharing. You don't have to capture actions,
>> >>> but
>> >>> you might want to limit how the roles of users vary, and I think
>> >>> modeling the security actions within each role is an excellent way to
>> >>> do
>> >>> so.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> On Wed, Aug 8, 2012 at 4:08 PM, Edmon Begoli <ebegoli@gmail.com
>> >>> <mailto:ebegoli@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>     I am trying to model the healthcare claim on accumulo and I want
>> >>> to
>> >>>     lay it out so that it:
>> >>>
>> >>>     A. Accurately reflects the structure of the claim
>> >>>
>> >>>     B. I could have controls finely applied to different sections of
>> >>> the
>> >>>     document
>> >>>
>> >>>     I am simplifying matter but claim contains claim document
>> >>> identifiers,
>> >>>     demographics of the patient, and line items for the procedures
>> >>>     performed:
>> >>>
>> >>>     claim identifier, data submitted, data processed, state of origin,
>> >>> ...
>> >>>     patient name, dob, location, other identifiers
>> >>>     procedure 1 code, procedure 1 provider, procedure 1 cost, ...
>> >>>     ...
>> >>>     procedure n code, procedure n provider, procedure n cost, ...
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>     Patient demographic fields are PHI (personal health information)
>> >>> and
>> >>>     these should not be visible to all who want to perform analysis,
>> >>> but
>> >>>     only to main administrators,
>> >>>     patient and maybe physician. I assume these would have to have
>> >>>     separate authorization label.
>> >>>
>> >>>     Other fields may be visible to different groups of people - i.e.
>> >>>     federal claim administrators can see all, but  regional offices
>> >>> can
>> >>>     only see their states.
>> >>>     Separate, more permissive labels.
>> >>>
>> >>>     Finally, it might make sense to "elevate" some fields for easy
>> >>> access
>> >>>     and analysis - ie. diagnostic codes, zip code, cost.
>> >>>     This would not be a matter of labels, but data design.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>     With all this in mind, I would welcome if anyone has any security
>> >>> and
>> >>>     data design suggestions.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >

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