accumulo-notifications mailing list archives

Site index · List index
Message view « Date » · « Thread »
Top « Date » · « Thread »
From "Christopher Tubbs (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (ACCUMULO-4045) Proposal to improve the security of Accumulo's password-based logons
Date Thu, 29 Oct 2015 19:44:27 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/ACCUMULO-4045?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=14981128#comment-14981128
] 

Christopher Tubbs commented on ACCUMULO-4045:
---------------------------------------------

Session tokens would get the same degree of protection, and carry similar risks, that we currently
have for passwords.

Session timeouts and revocation options add a temporal aspect to mitigate this sort of hijacking,
but do not eliminate it.

We can also enforce a same-origin policy, to ensure that the session token is valid only for
the client IP address which initiated the request for its construction. This provides additional
mitigation against session hijacking.

These are only mitigations, though, since we're still talking about password-based authentication
protections for the unencrypted RPC case. Obviously, TLS or SASL would be preferred. (Aside:
in future, I wouldn't mind forcing SASL for all connections... so long as it works over TLS
and we're confident there aren't performance problems affecting scale and latency.)

> Proposal to improve the security of Accumulo's password-based logons
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: ACCUMULO-4045
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/ACCUMULO-4045
>             Project: Accumulo
>          Issue Type: Improvement
>            Reporter: Christopher Tubbs
>
> There are some things we can do to improve the password-based authentication to Accumulo
without adding much overhead or introducing new APIs or RPCs.
> Of course, strong authentication using SASL or TLS is preferred, but those may not be
feasible for all users, and as long as we continue to support using Accumulo without requiring
these protocols, we should also consider ways to improve the simple password authentication
mechanism.
> So, with that in mind, I suggest:
> # Add a logon or "createSession" RPC method to effectively authenticate using a password
and create a session identifier for future use.
> # A flag on Connector to use a session, could be added, and Connector could be made AutoCloseable,
or another API could be added to clean up sessions. Sessions could also be made expirable.
> # When a session is created, the session information is stored in ZooKeeper, and used
to authenticate a user in lieu of a password on future RPC requests. The RPC data will be
able to distinguish whether it is of the session type or regular password type, for compatibility.
But, mostly session data would work just like passwords do today, with a simple compare/check.
> # To create a session, the server (any server which can currently do authentication)
receives a logon/createSession request, and responds with the user's salt, hash method, and
a nonce. The client hashes the password using the salt and hash method, to reproduce the hashed
version which the server already has. It then hashes again with the nonce and sends the result
back to the server. The server then compares this result with the result of its own hashing
of its stored value with the same nonce it sent to the client. If it matches, a session is
created, stored in ZooKeeper and returned.
> Now, this is certainly not a perfect solution, but it could be a way we can provide some
significant additional protection for password-based authentication without any of the additional
security/authentication mechanisms enabled for Accumulo, and with low overhead.



--
This message was sent by Atlassian JIRA
(v6.3.4#6332)

Mime
View raw message