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From "Christopher Tubbs (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (ACCUMULO-3513) Ensure MapReduce functionality with Kerberos enabled
Date Wed, 04 Feb 2015 21:22:35 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/ACCUMULO-3513?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=14305989#comment-14305989
] 

Christopher Tubbs commented on ACCUMULO-3513:
---------------------------------------------

{quote}YARN processes have kerberos principals and credentials, but the tasks they spawn do
not.{quote}

Oh. Interesting. So, the YARN process can securely authenticate itself with the job controller
(NodeManager? I'm not sure terminology here) before a job is submitted, but the task doesn't
have access to that. How do they prevent the tasks from getting access to the parent process'
Kerberos keytab? How are these tasks sandboxed? Could our Input/OutputFormat be configured
to access this keytab? I guess you might not want to do that if you don't trust the job which
was submitted, but I'm not sure how we (Accumulo services) can trust that the request is coming
from a trusted YARN service, and not some other party which maliciously gained access to a
client's delegation token.

{quote}This would require us have clients hold onto N delegation tokens though.{quote}

No, there'd still only be one delegation token in play, but whoever generated it might change.
I'm suggesting instead of a global, fixed "leader" involving coordination, a random "leader"
is selected for each delegation token.

{quote}You need the coordination to roll new secret keys. Using the same secret key for months
(assuming average uptime of a cluster) is just asking for attacks.{quote}

That's not what I was suggesting. I was suggesting eliminating the need to coordinate between
servers by making one server responsible for each token (corresponding to a temporary key
stored within that tserver).

{quote}Code will speak better than I can:...{quote}

Cool. Will take a look.

> Ensure MapReduce functionality with Kerberos enabled
> ----------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: ACCUMULO-3513
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/ACCUMULO-3513
>             Project: Accumulo
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components: client
>            Reporter: Josh Elser
>            Assignee: Josh Elser
>            Priority: Blocker
>             Fix For: 1.7.0
>
>         Attachments: ACCUMULO-3513-design.pdf
>
>
> I talked to [~devaraj] today about MapReduce support running on secure Hadoop to help
get a picture about what extra might be needed to make this work.
> Generally, in Hadoop and HBase, the client must have valid credentials to submit a job,
then the notion of delegation tokens is used by for further communication since the servers
do not have access to the client's sensitive information. A centralized service manages creation
of a delegation token which is a record which contains certain information (such as the submitting
user name) necessary to securely identify the holder of the delegation token.
> The general idea is that we would need to build support into the master to manage delegation
tokens to node managers to acquire and use to run jobs. Hadoop and HBase both contain code
which implements this general idea, but we will need to apply them Accumulo and verify that
it is M/R jobs still work on a kerberized environment.



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