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From "Sean Busbey (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Created] (ACCUMULO-3460) Monitor should not allow HTTP TRACE
Date Wed, 31 Dec 2014 21:40:13 GMT
Sean Busbey created ACCUMULO-3460:
-------------------------------------

             Summary: Monitor should not allow HTTP TRACE
                 Key: ACCUMULO-3460
                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/ACCUMULO-3460
             Project: Accumulo
          Issue Type: Bug
          Components: monitor
    Affects Versions: 1.6.1, 1.6.0, 1.5.2, 1.5.1, 1.5.0, 1.6.2
            Reporter: Sean Busbey
            Priority: Minor
             Fix For: 1.5.3, 1.7.0, 1.6.3


A Nessus scan pinged my test cluster because the Accumulo monitor allows HTTP TRACE requests.
(ref: [an overview of the general problem class|http://www.cgisecurity.com/whitehat-mirror/WH-WhitePaper_XST_ebook.pdf])

The issue isn't bad unless
* there's a same-origin-policy bypass for the user browser
* there's an auth token we care about

Exploits the bypass the same-origin-policy happen, so it's best to clean up server side if
possible.

The only auth tokens present in the Monitor are when we make use of the ShellServlet from
ACCUMULO-196. We rely on the session state for auth, so there isn't a risk of leaking auth
info directly, but we would leak the session id. 

The CSRF added in ACCUMULO-2785 means just the session id wouldn't be enough for impersonation,
but if an attacker can read one requested page we have to presume they can read another.

We should clean up our configs to disallow HTTP TRACE as a proactive measure.

Marking minor since an attack vector would need an enabling vulnerability on the client side.



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