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From "Josh Elser (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (ACCUMULO-2464) Trace user password required in plaintext in accumulo-site.xml
Date Thu, 13 Mar 2014 16:53:47 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/ACCUMULO-2464?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13933525#comment-13933525
] 

Josh Elser commented on ACCUMULO-2464:
--------------------------------------

IMO, it would be nice to get something better for the installations that aren't using external
authentication systems, but I do agree that interfacing with an external system is likely
the most secure solution we could come up with. I feel like that approach is leaving everyone
else high and dry.

[~ctubbsii] point received. Brainstorming some more, if you don't trust filesystem protections,
maybe there isn't a way to make it more secure than it is now using the same mechanisms. Perhaps
the only thing "obfuscating" the plaintext password is getting you is protection from the
guy standing over your shoulder?

> Trace user password required in plaintext in accumulo-site.xml
> --------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: ACCUMULO-2464
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/ACCUMULO-2464
>             Project: Accumulo
>          Issue Type: Improvement
>          Components: trace
>    Affects Versions: 1.5.1
>            Reporter: Josh Elser
>            Assignee: Josh Elser
>             Fix For: 1.5.2, 1.6.1
>
>
> The {{trace.password}} property is used by the Tracer to authenticate with Accumulo and
persist the traces in the trace table. Presently, this is required to be in plaintext which
is rather sub-par, but has been overlooked mostly because that password is for an isolated
user account which shouldn't have access to any sensitive data.
> I'm thinking of the following: provide some new storage in ZK akin to the acl + salt
that's currently done for the passwd db and instance.secret (with a new secret for this, of
course)
> Another option might be to provide a hashing command that will hash the password, store
that instead of the plaintext, and then use the hash with a salt to authenticate (not exposing
the hash-authentication method to users). Not sure how I feel about that.
> Leveraging some BCrypt library might be nice too (if there's an ASF license compatible
lib somewhere). 



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